For the first time on appeal, Cash Store contends there is no basis for the damages awarded for emotional distress

II. Damages. We apply the same standard of review for the trial court’s denial of the motion to vacate the damages award, and will not overturn the trial court’s decision unless we find a clear abuse of discretion. Calhoun v. Merritt, 46 Wash.App. 616, 619-20, 731 P.2d 1094 (1986). The trial court awarded Ms. . Additionally, the trial court awarded $15,000 for emotional distress and $6,500 for attorney fees and costs. Cash Store challenged these damages as improper under the law.

Johnson three times the amount she paid to Cash Store for her seven months of loan renewals, finding that these damages were appropriate under the CPA, RCW 19

Damages for emotional distress are not recoverable for a violation of the CPA. White River Estates v. Hiltbruner, 134 Wash.2d 761, 765 n. 1, 953 P.2d 796 (1998); Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass’n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wash.2d 299, 318, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993). The plaintiff who is successful on a CPA claim is entitled to actual damages and to the attorney fees and costs related to the CPA claim. RCW ; Sign-O-Lite Signs, Inc. v. DeLaurenti Florists, Inc., 64 Wash.App. 553, 566, 825 P.2d 714 (1992). Damages for emotional distress are generally limited to claims for intentional torts. White River, 134 Wash.2d at 766, 953 P.2d 796.

Even examined in the light most favorable to Cash Store, the arguments before the trial court did not rise above mere allegations and conclusions; they did not set out specific facts or errors constituting a prima facie defense

It contends the trial court improperly awarded emotional distress damages for the CPA violation. In its motion to vacate the default judgment, Cash Store merely argued that these damages were based on hearsay documents and that it needed discovery to determine what other circumstances might have caused Ms. Johnson’s emotional distress. Shepard, 95 Wash.App. at 239, 974 P.2d 1275. Consequently, the trial court did not err in finding that Cash Store did not present a prima facie defense to the award of damages.

Moreover, the award is supported by the record. True, Ms. Johnson did not specifically include in her complaint a cause of action for an intentional tort. However, the findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting the default judgment include a finding that Ms. Johnson suffered emotional distress due to Cash Store’s intentional and unconscionable conduct in threatening her with arrest, and a conclusion that Cash Store’s intentional and unconscionable conduct aggravated her pre-existing depression and insomnia. In her memorandum in opposition to Cash Store’s motion to vacate the default judgment, Ms. Johnson argued that Cash Store raised no defense to the damages incurred due to its intentional infliction of emotional distress. Because such damages are recoverable under a theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress, Rice v. Janovich, 109 Wash.2d 48, 61, 742 P.2d 1230 (1987), and because Cash Store raised no prima facie defense to this award, the trial court properly denied the motion to vacate the damages award.

Ms. Johnson requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to RCW . Because this statute authorizes reasonable attorney fees and costs only in “any action to enforce a support or maintenance order under this chapter,” RCW , it is not applicable to this case. RAP 18.1(b) requires a party to devote a section of his or her brief to the request for fees. In the prayer for relief in her respondent brief’s conclusion, Ms. Johnson stated that she respectfully asked the court to “1) affirm the trial court’s judgment awarding Ms. Johnson $26,701, plus the statutory interest; 2) affirm the trial court’s award of additional attorney fees, plus the statutory interest; and 3) award the Respondent reasonable costs and attorney fees pursuant to RCW .” Br. of Resp’t at 23-24. Mere inclusion of a request for fees and costs in the last line of the conclusion in a brief is not sufficient under RAP 18.1(b). Wilson Court Ltd. P’ship v. Tony Maroni’s, Inc., 134 Wash.2d 692, 710 n. 4, 952 P.2d 590 (1998). Consequently, Ms. Johnson is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal.